Friday 24 January 2014

technology and innovation developments in India



New Science, Technology and Innovation
Developments In India

Science, Technology and Innovation Developments In India
Abstract:
This article reviews the science and technology policies of India and how these have
fashioned India’s technology capability over the years. It shows that while India has
achieved enormous strides in the area of science, technology and innovation,
In appropriate policies in the past have hampered the development of an effective
national innovation system. The article concludes by drawing lessons for the
Development of an EU-wide science and technology policy.

1. Introduction
1.1 The Changing Scientific and Technological Landscape
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was internationally pre-eminent in science and
technology. The only country comparable to the US in terms of per capita innovative
output during this time was Switzerland and much of any significant scientific and
technological effort and achievement remained the exclusive preserve of a few advanced
industrialised countries. In the last 30 years or so, however, the economic landscape has
changed considerably and indeed continues to change with amazing rapidity. A situation
of strategic economic parity has come to exist in the triad regions of North America,
Western Europe and the Pacific Rim (including China). Increasing globalisation has
meant that several more nations have become important players on the world economic
stage and the rules of the game have subsequently changed. To some extent, it is no
longer easy for any one player to dictate the rules of the game - to determine what is
right or wrong, or what is or what ought to be.
In the area of science, technology and innovation, the supremacy of the United States
and the few other monopoly powers has become seriously challenged and partly eroded.
Several developments have materialised. Firstly, there has been increased competition
from fast followers, which has subjected advanced nations to competition via imitation by
firms in hitherto less innovative countries. Secondly, there has been a more rapid
diffusion of intellectual capital. This has been aided by the revolution in communications
technology, which has rendered the notion of space and time virtually irrelevant. The
result of this is that the advantage provided by a given amount of innovation decreases
rapidly with increased diffusion of intellectual capital. Thirdly, competition for investments
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) mean that these companies increasingly need to
locate investments wherever circumstances offer the greatest opportunity, including
Research and Development (R&D) activities. Lastly, there has been a steady, albeit
gradual, emergence of more nations that are innovators. These have consciously
committed themselves to the expansion of their innovative capacity with the result that
the historically small set of highly-innovative advanced countries has expanded. In
addition, the Scandinavian countries, the newly industrialising countries of South East
Asia, China and India are also beginning to make the transition from imitator to innovator.
This paper charts the various phases of science, technology and innovation (STI) policies
of India and their impact on the nation’s technology capability, and considers future policy
prospects and development implications. With a population of over 1000 million, India is
the world’s second largest country after China and the largest democracy. In terms of
land area, it is the seventh biggest country in the world. With a GDP of about $430bn,
India is the world’s eleventh richest nation but in purchasing power parity terms, it is
fourth after, the US, China and Japan.
The Indian economy has a strong element of duality. It is one of the most industrialised
countries in the world, with remarkable achievements in indigenous technology,
oceanography, deep-sea oil drilling, nuclear power, space and satellite communications
and armaments manufacture. It is also a successful agricultural country. Three-quarters
of the population owe their livelihoods to the sector, which coupled with fisheries and
mining, account for about one-third of gross domestic product (GDP).
The arrangement of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, section 2 charts
trends in India’s science and technology (S&T) policy since independence in 1947, while
section 3 considers the impact of recent policy. Section 4 looks at India’s stance in
relation to the multilateral system (the WTO), especially with regard to the TRIPS
agreement while section 5 looks at the future stance of policy and its implications for
India’s development. The last section concludes the paper and draws lessons for EU
S&T policy.
1.2 The Rationale for Science and Technology Policy
In a globalising world economy the comparative advantage based on endowments of
basic factors of production, like natural resources, has become less important. An
abundance of traditional factors of production – raw materials, energy, and unskilled
labour – is not enough to guarantee long-term success. Rather, it is continuous
innovation and improvement in productivity that are crucial. In this wise, national
competitive advantage is not inherited – it has to be created. And as most of the
innovative activity takes place in private enterprises, a country’s international
competitiveness is a question of how competitive its firms are, how its industries perform
in world markets, how its institutions are organised and how successfully its science,
technology and industrial policies affect the performance of firms and industries.
While it is the private sector that constitutes the engine of innovation, national policies
create environments that can encourage or constrain the ability of firms to innovate. The
more innovative firms are, the more they are profitable and the more value-added they
create in a nation. It is, therefore, vital for countries to put in place policies to create an
effective and efficient national innovation system (NIS). Four conditions need to be met
for building an effective national innovation system. These are a) strong and competitive
pressures on domestic firms; b) the presence of high quality human capital; c) well developed
links between industry, institutions and academia; and d) openness and
access to foreign technologies. These determinants of an NIS indicate that innovation
involves far more than science and technology. It cannot be denied, however, that a
forward-looking S&T policy can be developed to foster an appropriate mix of these
determinants. Indeed, the first step towards, and the necessary pre-requisite to, any
good NIS is an effective S&T policy. In recognition of this, all advanced and
industrialising countries consciously foster an S&T policy.
The pressures of international competition have made both knowledge creation and
exploitation vital for business success. As a result, the internationalisation of R&D has
increasing relevance for strategic management of companies and the strengthening of
national innovation systems. The globalisation of R&D is establishing deep roots for
several reasons. Firstly, changing geopolitical infrastructures are creating new
opportunities for synergistic R&D activities across national frontiers. Secondly, rapidly
changing technologies are no longer constrained by geographical boundaries. Thirdly,
increasing complexities of technological systems are making it imperative to generate
and implement knowledge in emerging fields quickly and collaboratively. Fourthly, the
need for brainpower with an ever-increasing sophistication is being met by identifying
and employing people with the appropriate skills at appropriate locations wherever they
may be. International R&D strategy is thus emerging to meet these challenges. To this
end, firms in developed countries and increasingly in some developing countries are
being driven to take advantage of world-wide science and technology resources.
These factors have spurred the growth of science and technology developments in those
nations, which have conducive environments. Israel, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea
and, to a lesser extent, Ireland, have made substantial progress in upgrading their
innovative capacity and, as a result, have become beneficiaries of foreign investments in
science and technology ventures. Although countries such as India, China and Malaysia,
have increased investments in areas related to science, technology and innovation at
modest levels, there is little doubt that some of these, especially China and India, are
potential scientific powerhouses.
2. Trends in STI Developments in India
2.1 Market-oriented Reforms in India
India is experiencing an economic renaissance. Economic reforms introduced by the Rao
administration in 1991 in the wake of serious macroeconomic difficulties have taken root
and a major restructuring of the economy, albeit slow, is continuing. With a population of
over 1000 million including an estimated middle class of about 250 million people, India’s
domestic market potential among developing countries is second only to China’s, and
close to all countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) combined.
After independence in 1947, the early leaders of India committed themselves to a policy
of industrialisation based on self-reliance. For almost four decades after independence,
India pursued an isolationist and import-substitution strategy across all its sectors. This
produced large and inefficient enterprises, many of them state-owned and unaccustomed
to competition. The result was an economic growth typically of 3.5% per year (equivalent
to 1% growth per capita) – what had become known as the “Hindu rate of growth”.
From the early 1980s, a growing consensus emerged in favour of economic
liberalisation. Powerful vested interests, including leaders of protected industry, unions
and politicians, ensured that early initiatives were limited to little more than incentives to
exporters, minor industrial deregulation and some simplification of the tax regime. The
modest changes led to an average growth of 5.3% a year, which was not only much
higher than that of the decades before but was also better than the growth performance
of all developing countries put together. The high degree of protection from foreign
competition and the basic problem of erosion of competitiveness of Indian exports
continued. However, a more activist policy to achieve a depreciation of the real effective
exchange rate was pursued with a view to boosting exports.
The fiscal policies of the Central Government also became expansionary in the 1980s to
support growing expenditure on account of sharply rising interest payments and
expenditures on defence and subsidies. The gross fiscal deficit of Central Government
increased from 6.2% in 1980/81 to 8.4% by 1990/91. The rate of inflation of 8.2% was
stable but the current account deficit rose from 2.5% in 1985/86 to 3.3% in 1990/91.
The Gulf War in 1990 precipitated a balance of payment crisis and this was not helped by
the political instability at the beginning of the 1990s, which combined to cause a collapse
of international confidence in the ability of the government to manage the economy. This
caused external commercial loans and inflow of non-resident Indian (NRI) capital to dry
up. The stage was set for a possible international default. Despite emergency borrowing
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the level of exchange reserves dropped to
just over $1 billion, barely sufficient to finance imports for a fortnight. The rate of inflation
accelerated to double digits (10.30%) from 7.4% a year earlier. By August 1990, inflation
had shot upwards to 17%.
It was within this background that the newly elected Government of Mr Rao launched a
programme of ambitious economic reforms in July 1991. The reforms were designed
within an overall dual strategy whereby fiscal adjustment aims to achieve
macroeconomic stability were combined with structural reforms in industrial, trade and
financial policies to strengthen growth capacity and international competitiveness of
Indian industry.
The main tenets of the reforms included:
·         the opening up of more sectors to private investment and participation – power, steel,
oil refining and exploration, road construction, air transport, telecommunications,
ports, mining, pharmaceuticals and financial services.
·         encouragement of FDI with majority equity, except in a few strategic sectors, and
portfolio investment. Red tape was significantly reduced.
·         de-licensing of most industries to encourage competition. Domestic investment in
defence-related items was permitted.
·         trade liberalisation. Some import quotas were converted into tariffs, and the tariff
system was simplified to reduce the number of bands and achieve a reduction in
overall rates. As of 2001 (April), quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports have been
removed.
·         the taking out of state control some aspects of business decision-making such as the
location of new enterprise and technology transfer.
·         the exchange regime was liberalised, with the devaluation of the rupee by 22%
against the US dollar in two instalments in July 1991. A market-determined exchange
rate was introduced in March 1993 and current account convertibility in August 1994.
(the rupee is, however, not yet fully convertible on the capital account).
·         Reform of capital markets. Private mutual funds, country funds and foreign
institutional investors (FIIs) were all made active investors.
Since 1991, the reform agenda has been progressed at every annual budget to bring the
Indian economy into closer integration with the rest of the world.
2.2 Trends in India’s Science and Technology Policy
It has long been recognised that investment in science and technology makes substantial
contribution to economic growth in terms of higher growth rates of an economy’s total
factor productivity (Abramovitz, 1956, Denison 1962 and Solow, 1957, among others). In
addition to direct returns, huge (positive) externalities have also been found to be
associated with it (Abramovitz, 1989). Taking cognisance of the importance of
technology’s role in development, advanced countries nurture continuing development of
science and technology and most developing countries adopt R&D policies in the early
phases of their development. Science and Technology policy constitutes an integral part
of a nation’s overall industrial policy (Barber and White, 1987). While the former shapes
the pace and direction of technology development, the latter determines the nature of
demand. This section reviews the evolution of Science and Technology policy in India
since independence.
Science and Technology policy of any nation is carved within the background of overall
industrial policy. If anything, S&T policy is supposed not only to give meaning to, but
more importantly, to ensure achievement of the goals of industrial policy. It is therefore
the thrust and direction of industrial policy that determines the tenets of any S&T policy,
although it must be said that R&D may lead to results that may also change the course of
industrial policy. Even so, S&T policy has almost always been driven by the goals of
industrial development policy. This section therefore describes the development strategy
adopted by the government in the various phases of development and analyses the
accompanying S&T policy. Two strands of S&T policy have existed – policies related to
technology transfer from abroad through formal modes such as FDI, technology licensing
and capital goods imports and domestic technology generation policies.
Having realised that the pursuit of autarkic economic policies in much of the post independence
period to 1990 was a mistake, India undertook sweeping reforms as a way
of speeding economic growth and achieving faster integration into the world economy.
Part of these reforms has been the re-enactment of a science and technology policy
more suited to the achievement of the goals of building a prosperous nation.
The Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 had, among its objectives, the aim of “injecting
the desired level of technological dynamism into Indian Industry” and “the development of
indigenous competence for the efficient absorption of foreign technology”. It also
expressed the hope “that greater competitive pressure will induce our industry to invest
much more in research and development than they have been doing in the past”. The
intention was to create a national innovation system (NIS) that was in sharp contrast to
that prevailing prior to the July 1991. The national innovation system of a country is the
set of institutions, policies and organisations and the interactions between them that
determine the level of innovation arising from that country. While the increase in
globalisation has resulted in some dilution of the importance of the boundaries of the
nation-state from an economic perspective, the NIS continues to be an important
determinant of a nation’s economic performance.
After independence in August 1947, the Indian Government, under Jawaharlal Nehru set
itself the task of socio-economic transformation of the country through a process of
central planning. Science was given considerable importance in the development
“Plans”, as its significance in national development was recognised. Nehru’s firm belief
that science and technology could play a major role in bringing both material and cultural
benefit to the people of India may be summed up in a statement he made prior to
independence and in the preamble of the very first S&T policy document prepared in
1958 under his guidance.
“And I hope with Lord Rutherford that in the days to come, India will again become the
home of science, not only as a form of intellectual activity, but also as a means of
furthering the progress of her people”
Jawaharlal Nehru, 26 December 1937.
“The key to national prosperity, apart from the spirit of the people, lies in the modern age,
in the effective combination of three factors, technology, raw materials and capital, of
which the first is perhaps the most important, since the creation and adoption of new
scientific techniques can, in fact, make up for a deficiency in natural resources and
reduce the demand on capital. But technology can only grow out of the study of science
and its application”.
IPR 1958.
From independence in 1947 to date, India has had three distinct stances of industrial
policy and, in consequence, three phases of commensurate science and technology
policy. Aggarwal (2001) delineates these as (a) the Initial Growth Phase (1947-68), (b)
the Restrictive Phase (1969-1980) and (c) the Liberalized Phase (1980-1990 and 1991 to
date).
The Initial Growth Phase
The genesis of India's industrial policies was the Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR), the
work for which was started in 1948 and passed in 1958. Under this policy, India pursued
a policy of import-substitution and placed emphasis on basic and heavy industries. A
faster growth rate in the productive capacity of capital goods industries was seen as vital
to raising savings and investment rates, diversifying the industrial sector and promoting
manufactured exports. Given the negligible R&D base at this time, flows of foreign
technologies were required and indeed encouraged. FDI, technology licensing and
financial and technical collaborations were allowed over a wide range of industries.
In this liberal atmosphere, industrial boom in India started to take off in the late 1950s.
The policy of import-substitution created and sustained demand for foreign technologies.
Foreign collaborations increased six-fold between 1948/55 and 1964/70. The FDI stock
more than doubled to Rs5660 million between 1948 and 1964. Technology-related
royalty payments jumped sixteen-fold between 1956/7 and 1967/8. As noted by Desai
(1980), the building of industrial capacity proceeded almost totally on the basis of
imported technology, and, in the absence of any need to improve competitiveness, there
was little or no incentive to learn, absorb, assimilate and upgrade foreign technologies to
create capabilities. While industrialisation proceeded on back of foreign technologies,
"R&D promotion policies focused on creating a scientific and research base" (Aggarwal
2001). The IPR (1958) considered the creation of a scientific base as a pre-requisite for
developing the domestic R&D base on the premise that “technology grows out of the
study of science and its application" (Aggarwal 2001). This stance led to substantial
investments in the establishment of science-based educational and R&D infrastructure.
The number of engineering colleges and seats rose from 38 and 2940 in 1947 to 138 and
25000 respectively in 1970. In 1968, the Indian Institutes of Technology, modelled on
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, were set up. There was also a rapid
expansion of agencies like the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the
Department of Atomic Energy and the Defence Research and Development
Organisation. Such R&D as was performed at this time was centred on:
a) scaling down of plants based on foreign technology to suit Indian markets
b) adapting foreign processes to Indian conditions and local materials and,
c) tackling on-the-spot production problems and quality control.
As Desai (1980) has put it, this was a period when the emphasis was on R&D with a
short pay-off, although it must be said that over the period India built a substantial
scientific base and R&D capability.
The Restrictive Phase
There was a major policy shift in the late 1960s. A foreign exchange crisis induced the
government to pursue a policy of "self-reliance", thereby moving the focus in national
planning from merely “growth” to “growth with self-reliance and social justice." Besides,
the Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act ushered in a period of
regulation in which the expansion of large firms was regulated, a reservation policy to
protect the small-scale sector was introduced and banks and financial institutions were
nationalised to ensure the flow of credit to designated sectors. The result of this policy
change for science and technology was that technological self-reliance also became
important. The basic stance was that technology should not be imported to the detriment
of local development effort and that R&D structures created earlier should be used to
meet the industrial demand for technologies (Sandhya et al 1990). To generate demand
for domestic technologies, the earlier policies on technology acquisition were reversed
and the emphasis was shifted from “science and scientific development” to “technology
and technological development” (Aggarwal 2001). Foreign collaborations were severely
restricted and FDI was allowed only in core industries where no alternative local
technologies were available. To deal with the situation arising from the restrictions on
technology acquisition, a Department of Science and Technology (DST) was set up.
S&T planning was made part of the overall planning process in the Fifth Plan (1974-
1979).
The impact of these policies is well documented. Technology transfers declined
drastically between 1968 and 1980. FDI inflows declined and in the late 1970s there was
a net outflow. Growth of royalty payments slowed, from 22.3% annually between 1970-
76 to 15.2% between 1977-85. Having said that, it must be pointed out that some
positive benefits accrued. Local R&D activities increased. R&D expenditures in private
companies increased more than eight-fold to Rs1207 million between 1970/71 and
1980/81. The number of registered units in the private sector rose from 156 in 1969 to
516 in 1979. R&D expenditures in the CSIR rose from Rs215 million in 1970/71 to
Rs690 million in 1980/81. This led to near self-sufficiency in standard technologies and
India indeed began to export technology.
While the above achievements are certainly noteworthy, these policies did not engender
a well-performing national innovation system. The vital ingredients of technology
acquisition, technology generation and technology diffusion were not balanced and were
not consistent with industrial and macro-economic policies. What is more, the four
conditions - strong competitive environment, high quality human capital, well-developed
linkages between industry, institutions and academia and access to foreign technologies
- were either not tailored to the innovation system or that there was lack of an appropriate
mix of them. Macroeconomic policies stifled all forms of competition. Industrial licensing
suppressed competition from within and restrictive trade and FDI suppressed competition
from without. Industrial production growth rates stagnated. Exports grew slowly so that
by the late 1970s, the balance of payments had become a matter of concern. While,
India achieved self-sufficiency in technologies for local production and consumption due
to the policy of import-substitution and self-reliance, it could not build capacity in worldclass
technologies to produce for international markets (Lall 1987). Although India
achieved proficiency in standard technologies, it remained dependent for highly
expensive and complicated technologies (Bhagwan 1995). Not surprisingly, the share of
technology intensive imports in total imports rose from 63% in 1970/71 to 80% 10 years
later. Total factor productivity declined and became negative (ICICI 1994) and its
contribution to the growth rate of 3% was as low as 0.2% between 1970 and 1980
(UNCTAD 1992).
At the corporate level, in the closed economy that India was at that time, there was little
incentive to improve efficiency of resource use. Besides, the licence regime created a
market structure of a few large firms and a large number of small firms. While the former
lacked the incentive to undertake R&D, the latter were too small and had limited
resources to do so. Policies of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) and MRTP
restricted the growth of large firms, except through diversification. This constituted a
serious disincentive for committing resources to R&D and affected their capability to do
so. Not surprisingly, R&D expenditures became insignificant. In 1982/3, 55% of private
sector R&D units spent less than Rs1 million on R&D, with the average being Rs 0.35
million, as Aggarwal (2001) notes. In the absence of the resources and the need to
generate new technologies, importation was resorted to. Such imported technology was
adapted to local needs, with little effort being devoted to learning, assimilating or
improving it.
The Liberalised Phase
Mid-1991 marks a watershed in this phase. A policy of liberalisation and a reversal of the
previous inward-looking policy had commenced in the 1980s but this was a half-hearted
and scanty attempt to appease certain sections of the economy. In the 1980s, in view of
declining exports, worsening balance of payments and stagnating industrial growth
spanning over a decade, the Government of India decided to re-orientate industrial and
trade policies. The Sixth Plan (1979-84) Document gave a directive of "growth with
efficiency" away from the previous "growth with social justice and self-reliance". The
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1980 stressed the need for optimal use of resources and
higher productivity. It proposed liberalisation of the industrial licensing regime (the
licence raj) and foreign trade. The process of deregulation was implemented in a
number of industries and some major reforms were introduced in the mid-1980s,
including reductions in import restrictions and tariffs.
With shifts in Plan (India’s development plans are operated in 5-year blocks) priorities,
technology acquired a stronger focus. Restrictions on technology imports and foreign
equity participation were relaxed. Up to 51% foreign equity was permitted in many
sectors, except in those reserved for the public sector. In areas of sophisticated
technology and/or export-oriented ventures, up to 100 percent equity was allowed. The
Technology Policy statement of 1983, for the first time, recognised the need for
establishing linkages between scientific, technological and financial institutions to
promote effective transfer of technology from institutions to industry. A fully-fledged
Ministry of Science and Technology was created in 1985, with the earlier Department of
Science and Technology (DST) and a new Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research (DSIR) as constituents. A high level post of scientific adviser and a science
advisory council to the Prime Minister were set up in 1986 to advise the Prime Minister
on major issues relating to S&T development. Also, a quality system management (SM)
scheme to strengthen in-house R&D and provide quality assurance of same was set up
as well as a DSIR scheme to grant recognition to scientific and industrial research
organisations (SIROs) in the private sector.
However, it was in July 1991 that India undertook sweeping reforms to open the country
to foreign investment and deregulate most of Indian industry (see section 2.1). More
than 80 percent of Indian Industry was de-licensed, the number of industries reserved for
the public sector was reduced from seventeen in 1990 to six, and plans were put forward
for the divestment/privatisation of public sector undertakings. Besides fostering domestic
competition, the economy was opened to external/foreign competition. Tariffs were
reduced progressively from a maximum of 300% in 1991 to 65% in 1994/95 and to about
20% currently. The Rupee was made convertible on the current account. The tempo of
liberalisation has continued and every budget proposal since 1991 has included a further
move into reforms in the financial, infrastructure, information technology,
telecommunications and foreign trade and investment sectors.
In this progressive environment, the promotion of R&D has re-established its importance,
not only for the exploitation of inward technology but also to improve the efficiency of
technology transfer. A new draft of the Technology Policy enacted in 1993, placed
emphasis on the strengthening of linkages between industry, R&D institutions and
financial institutions for encouraging commercial exploitation of technologies developed
in laboratories. It recommended a consortium approach to R&D and technology
development involving academic institutions, national research laboratories and user industries
for goal-oriented programmes and new product development. To ensure
success of domestic R&D, many new policy measures have been adopted and
implementation structures set up.
A major initiative has been the restructuring of public institutions and the strengthening of
India's role in international organisations. The CSIR has taken on a more commercial
orientation. Directives have been issued requesting the CSIR to generate at least 30%
of its budget from consultancy and technology "sale" to the private sector. It is hoped
that this figure will reach 45% in the very near future. The CSIR has participated in the
activities of international organisations such as UNCTAD, WIPO, UNIDO, ESCAP and
APCTT at various levels and forums on issues related to science, technology
development and transfer. India plans to strengthen its role in these deliberations. In
addition, India plans to play an active role in the work of the WTO in all areas of
international relations, including the thorny issue of trade-related intellectual property
rights (TRIPS).
3. Response to/Impact of Reforms
3.1 The Macro-economy
India’s economic reforms and trade liberalisation contributed to a dramatic increase in its
economic growth in the mid-1990s. Larger inflows of foreign direct investment and
increased international trade helped India achieve annual average growth rates of 7% in
the mid-1990s. Economic growth slowed, however, in 1997, owing to political instability
and global economic slowdown. Growth picked up again and has hovered around the 6%
mark since then. While not remarkable, especially if set against the growth performance
of China in the 1990s, India’s growth of between 6-7% annually is way above the “Hindu
rate of growth” that characterised much of the post independence period to the 1980s
(table 1).
 
Reform of India’s trade regime has led to increased trade. For most of the 1980s, India’s
total exports hovered around the $10,000 million mark while imports were around
$15,000 million. As open policies encouraged trade, exports rose from $18,145 million in
1990 to $44,560 million in 2000. Similarly, imports rose from $24,072 million to $50,536
million in the same period. The nation has become more open to trade, although the
trade balance increased over the period.
Protectionism afforded Indian industry a home market free of competition. As a result,
there was no great desire to seek foreign markets. What is more, bureaucratic
procedures for entry into foreign markets were cumbersome. Since the early 1990s,
however, Indian firms have had to look beyond the confines of the country for growth and
survival. Companies like Wipro, HCL, Dr Reddy’s Lab, Infosys Technologies and
Ranbaxy Labs have all made substantial incursions into overseas markets, including
acquisitions, joint ventures and R&D centres.
Traditionally an exporter of mainly primary products such as coffee, tea, iron ore and
gems, India has in recent years been exporting high technology products such as
software and pharmaceuticals. In the software sector, the progress has been remarkable.
The growth of about 50% annually in the last six years has been primarily on the back of
software exports. It is forecast that software and related services will grow to account for
7.7% of GDP and 35% of Indian exports by 2008. Also noteworthy is the fact that many
of the Indian companies that have become successful exporters today are new ventures
and where they already existed never exported before prior to 1991.
3.2 The Role on MNEs
3.2.1 Growth of Foreign Investment
One striking feature of the global economy in the last few decades has been the
phenomenal growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) or investment by MNEs in foreign
countries in order to control assets and manage production activities in those countries.
Since the early 1980s, world FDI flows now attributable to over 60,000 MNEs, have
grown much faster than world output (table 2). During 1980-97, global FDI flows
increased at an average rate of about 13% per year, compared with rates of about 7% for
both world exports of goods and non-factor services and for world GDP. In both 1998
and 1999, FDI expanded phenomenally, recording 45% and 55% respectively. A
slowdown occurred in 2000, with a growth of 18% to reach a record world level of $1.3
trillion. The increase in direct investment flows has laid a solid foundation for a marked
expansion in international production by MNEs, which now have an estimated $6.3 trillion
invested in over half a million foreign affiliates throughout the world. The value of sales
by these foreign affiliates has risen much faster than that of foreign trade (world exports)
reaching nearly $16 trillion in 2000.
 
As FDI has expanded in volume, so has it also become more widespread among home
(outward investor) and host (recipient) countries. Developed countries remain the prime
destination of FDI, accounting for more than three-quarters of global inflows. Inflows into
developing countries have, however, been growing steadily since the late 1980s. From
less than $20 billion, FDI inflows to developing countries increased twelve-fold to reach
$240 billion in 2000, representing a share of 19% of the total.
FDI has become an important source of private external finance, especially in developing
countries. Given its potential role in accelerating growth and economic transformation,
there is fierce competition among developing countries in attracting it. Not only can FDI
add to investible funds and capital formation (table 3), it is also a means of transferring
production technology, innovative capacity and organisational and managerial practices
between locations. While the first to benefit is the foreign investor, their assets can also
be transferred to domestic firms and the wider economies of host countries, if a
conducive environment exists. The greater the supply and distribution links between
foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms, and the stronger the capabilities of domestic
firms to capture spill over’s from the presence of and competition from such foreign firms,
the more likely it is that FDI will enhance productivity and competitiveness. MNEs are
looking to invest in countries with state-of-the-art FDI policy frameworks and a range of
business facilitation systems. With liberal policy frameworks becoming commonplace,
success in attracting FDI has become more dependent on business facilitation factors
such as cost reduction, larger markets to reap economies of scale, transport and
communications infrastructure, marketing networks, technology and innovative capacity.
Also increasing in importance is the agglomeration economies that arise from industrial
clustering, regional market access and competitive pricing of resources and facilities.
 

Among developing countries, though, the distribution of FDI inflows is uneven. In 2000,
the major recipient blocs were Latin America and the Caribbean, 35%, East and South
East Asia (excluding China) 39%, China 17%, and Central and Eastern Europe, 10%.
Africa continues to fare worst with a share of less than 4%. India, the largest recipient in
South Asia, received $2 billion in 2000, a world share of only 0.16%.
The 1990s witnessed a radical change in India’s policy towards foreign investment, from
being restrictive and selective to becoming receptive and pro-active. The July 1991
Industrial policy represented a radical transformation of foreign investment policy. Prior
to that, Government policy had been skewed towards investment that involved
technology transfer. This stance found full expression in the 1973 Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA), which imposed a ceiling of 40% on equity shareholding of foreign
companies and required dilution to 40% of existing companies which were not deemed to
be operating in “hi-tech” and strategic sectors. It also imposed limitations on royalty
payments. The exit from India of companies like IBM and Coca-Cola was the result of
the implementation of this Act.
In the new liberalised environment, however, foreign investment is permitted in virtually
all sectors of the economy. Foreign investment is now actively sought and encouraged
in all sectors, especially in infrastructures. In technology-related investments, royalty
payments have been considerably liberalised. Technology imports are automatically
approved for royalty payments up to 5% of domestic sales and 8% of export sales. Also,
Government permission for hiring foreign technical personnel is no longer required.
The result of these measures have been that FDI rose from under $100 million in 1990 to
a peak of just over $3 billion in 1997, accounting for 3% of developing countries’ inflow.
Since then, inflows have declined, amounting to just about $2 billion in 2000. The
decline in FDI in the last three years has been the result of a combination of several
factors, including political uncertainty in 1997 and 1998 and the world economic
slowdown. Another explanation for India’s small and declining share is the bureaucratic
nature of its approvals-to-actual regime. Less than one-third (31.3%) of the total
amount of FDI approved in the period January 1991 to October 1999 actually
materialised. There is thus need for further reform of the FDI regime if India is to benefit
increasingly from foreign capital inflows. Having said that, it must be noted that there
have been instances where FDI has not been seen to bring net benefits to the host
country. India believes that a “go-slow” strategy to determine the costs and benefits of
each case is necessary, although this can cause delay and, with it, a much lower inflow
than would be the case otherwise.
India has also seen a marked improvement in portfolio investment since 1991. From a
level of only $6 million in fiscal 1990, portfolio investment increased remarkably to $3824
million in fiscal 1994. As table 4 shows, the level of investment fell sharply between
1997 and 1999. The decline is attributable to the contagion, which adversely affected
capital flows to all emerging markets in the 1997-99 period. A strong recovery followed
subsequently. As India continues further reforms in the insurance and other service
sectors, portfolio investment is likely to grow significantly.
 
The United States tops the list of countries investing in India since 1991 and accounts for
over one-quarter of total foreign investments, with Mauritius following with about 10%. In
the three years to fiscal 1997, Mauritius led as the dominant source of FDI inflows, with
the USA and South Korea in second and third places. On the sectoral side, electronics
and electrical equipment and engineering industries account for the largest share of
investment. Investment in telecommunications account for 20% of the total, followed by
the power sector with 17%. The service sector registered a share of 7%.
 
3.2.2 Global R&D Centres
Hirwani and Jain (1999) have shown that although market-oriented activities were more
important to MNEs in most of the 1990s, technology oriented activities are growing in
importance. Hitherto, MNEs had been emphasising a strategy of customising products
for the Indian market and of obtaining cost-efficient manufacturing facilities in India.
Increasingly, however, there has been a clear move towards obtaining access to high quality
scientists, engineers and designers in India. Some R&D centres set up in India by
some MNEs conduct contract research for the corporate laboratories outside India.
Prior to 1991, the establishment of such R&D centres by MNEs was consciously lacking.
Since India signed the GATT Agreement in 1993 and subsequently passed the
Intellectual Property law in 1994, over 60 MNEs have set up R&D centres in technology intensive
industries, mostly to take advantage of the strong pool of highly-trained
engineers and scientists. Before 1991, there were only two such centres in the country.
Apart from the setting up of new centres in India to take advantage of the liberalised
atmosphere, the raison d’être and mode of operation of existing centres have also been
changing by the new market environment. Some companies have completely
restructured their R&D centres in India, shifting the focus from developing products for
Indian markets to making them centres of global excellence. Others have expanded their
operations and hired many Indian scientists and technologists. This is more evident in
the areas of information and computer technology. Such centres conduct R&D for worldwide
operations. The availability of high quality labour has been a motivating factor in the
establishment of centres by companies such as Astra, Unilever, GE and Software
Development Centres of Texas Instruments, Oracle, Microsoft and others. Substantial
R&D presence has also been established in the areas of pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology.
3.2.3 Collaborative Ventures and Technology Alliances
Policies adopted in the era of liberalisation resulted in a tremendous increase in
investment including technology inflows. Table 6 shows some indicators of performance
with regard to technology acquisition. Technology payments have increased substantially
and so has expenditures on the acquisition of new plants and machinery. As a result,
capital goods import increased sharply in the 1990s. At the micro level, policy reforms
have increased pressure for survival and efficiency of Indian organisations. In a
relatively open economy, new business opportunities have also arisen for Indian firms as
a result of greater national integration with the global economy. At the same time, these
reforms have created opportunities for foreign companies to enter the Indian market.
 
Of increasing importance has been the growth of technological strategic alliances for
R&D between MNEs and other foreign firms and Indian organisations having strong
technological capabilities. Simultaneously, some remarkable changes are taking place in
a number of India’s institutes of engineering, science and technology, as well as in some
of the better-known universities. Companies such as IBM, Philips, DuPont, GE and
others have been establishing R&D ventures on the campuses of a number of Indian
academic institutions. This has induced some Indian companies to follow suit, thereby
assisting local organisations and institutions to shift more into business-led R&D.
Recent studies show that there has been a definite change towards increased product
development and innovation (Krishnan and Prabhu, 1959). Much of this has often been
through collaborative arrangements with India and foreign counterparts. An excellent
example of this has been the development of an integrated shop floor automation system
for improving manufacturing productivity. The project was the result of joint effort
between Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited’s R&D Division and PSG College of
Technology in Coimbatore, and with partial financing from, and project monitoring by, the
Ministry of Technology. The software industry typifies how collaboration between local
and foreign experts can lead to a remarkable success story.
Several foreign consultants have, since the mid-1980s, played important roles in new
product development as well as in the process of improving production efficiencies,
optimising product-mix and generally helping companies to become more competitive.
These include firms like McKinsey and Company, Price Waterhouse Coopers and A T
Kearny. International consulting firms like McKinsey and A T Kearny have made
significant contributions in changing mindsets, providing information and data on
international benchmarks and helping to build awareness of international best practice.
These came to India on the wings of liberalisation and have slowly but surely built a base
and reputation for themselves, despite initial widespread scepticism on the part of their
clients.
Consulting firms have also been invited and used by central and some state
governments to restructure state-owned enterprises and infrastructural projects as well
as to provide help in attracting foreign investment and in creating attractive investment
conditions. The states of Maharashtra, Andra Pradesh, West Bengal and Orissa have all
used foreign consultants to varying degrees. Industry associations have and continue to
work with consultants. For example the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) worked
with Michael Porter to look at the competitiveness of Indian industry while NASSCOM
has worked with McKinsey on the growth potential of the software and IT-enabled service
industries.
3.3 Software, IT-Enabled and Related Services
India has become a prominent destination for the setting up of development centres for
software as well as the provision of back-office and support services such as call centres
and data processing. The Indian software/IT industry is an excellent example of a
domestic industry, which has developed rapidly as a result of collaboration with industry
in the developed world. Its rapid growth has primarily been on the back of large cost
differentials that exist between expert labour in India and the developed world, where
most of the demand resides. These IT centres have either been set up by MNEs as
subsidiary companies or by large Indian companies as committed centres for a particular
company. Contractual arrangements for outsourcing with Indian companies have been
increasing and are now common. These developments have led to the phenomenal
growth of the Indian software and IT-enabled services sector. In fiscal 2000, the industry
reported revenues of $8.26 billion, $6.25 billion of which was accounted for by exports.
Five years ago, the industry accounted for only 2% of the nation’s exports. Today it
accounts for 14% of exports and about 2% of GDP. Some MNEs have also tapped into
the knowledge base of the country and set up knowledge-intensive service businesses to
serve their global operations. These include the McKinsey Centre near Delhi and GE’s
Welch Technology Centre at Bangalore, set up to undertake multi-function R&D.
This remarkable success story has been the result of a policy orchestrated by the Indian
Government in the early 1980s to build technological capability in Electronics. The
genesis was the announcement of a policy on electronic components in 1981, which set
the stage for the creation of an internationally-competitive production base in the country.
In 1983, the Government announced certain special tariff and tax concessions for the
industry. Further in March 1984, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1958 was amended
to permit the entry by the private sector into the manufacture of telecommunications
equipment and computer hardware. This was followed by a policy to foster the
development of software primarily for export. Imports of inputs for potential software
exporters were facilitated. The Government also lowered duties on imported software
and simplified procedures for such imports for potential software developers and allowed
100% export-oriented companies to import hardware free of duty. This policy came to be
known as the “flood in, flood out” approach, allowing imports to flood in, in the hope that
exports would flood out (Desai and Khan 1986).
The domestic electronics market was later opened to foreign participants as long as such
entrants shared equity with Indian partners. A flood of entry took place immediately, with
companies like Hewlett Packard, DEC, Olivetti and others coming in. In the software
segment, 100% equity shareholding was allowed for foreign firms that were 100% export oriented.
They also benefited from generous subsidies in “export processing zones”
(Khan 2000).
The number of software companies has grown to over 1600, employing over 300
thousand people. New local set-ups are constantly coming on stream, just as more
foreign companies are either setting up in India or availing themselves of IT services at
highly competitive rates. It is estimated that the software/IT sector could grow to
achieve exports worth about $50 billion by 2008. This may be optimistic in view of
certain weaknesses and constraints. Firstly the Indian software industry typically
operates at the low market end of the global business. Secondly, it is hampered by weak
telecommunications and networking infrastructure. What is more, the Indian business
environment does not provide a good learning ground for software developers owing to
the very little customer/client interaction that exists with domestic industry. In order to
achieve this projected growth, the Indian Prime Minister has set up a task force on
Information Technology and Software Development to foster the local development of
critical inputs such as human capital, telecommunications infrastructure and world-class
IT hardware.
3.4 Commercial Orientation of Public Research Organisations
India has a strong industrial research infrastructure, which was fostered in the early
stages of its post-independence growth. While the supply-side was generously
supported, the industrial research system, prior to liberalisation, was mostly geared to
import substitution (Bowonder and Richardson, 2000). The publicly funded Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and other bodies tended to be isolated entities
with little or no links to industry. In such a protected environment, there was no need to
benchmark their activities to those of global players. Also their activities were only
marginally focused on commercialisation. The last decade has seen many of these
laboratories become more commercially oriented. They have been directing their efforts
towards international quality R&D. Two recent major policy thrusts have been (a) an
increase in the quest for patenting in Europe and the USA, as a means of engendering a
strong desire to undertake R&D and to innovate and (b) an increase in the commercial
orientation of industrial research, with a view to making these bodies less dependent on
public budgetary support.
New Science, Technology and Innovation Developments In India
3.5 Industrial Clusters
The agglomeration, scale and scope economies that are reaped in Silicon Valley are well
known. In pre-liberalised India, the government explicitly tried to promote balanced
industrial development by providing incentives for companies to set up in “backward”
areas. In pursuit of this goal, public sector units were set up in locations that sometimes
created strong locational disadvantages for their future development as well as for
efficiency. A departure from this policy, especially by some entrepreneurially minded
state governors (Chief Ministers) and a conscious encouragement of industrial clusters in
recent years, have created enormous benefits to firms and local economies. Bangalore,
dubbed the Silicon Valley of India, is clearly the base of a high technology cluster.
Thirteen of the twenty-three companies in the world rated at level 5 on the Software
Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (CMM) are located in Bangalore
(Krishnan, 2001). About 35% of the risk capital invested in India between 1998 and 2001
is estimated to have been invested in Bangalore. In view of Bangalore’s success, other
states such as Masharastra and Andra Pradesh are encouraging other high technology
and biotechnology clusters.
3.6 FDI Spill-overs and Technological Capability
Liberalisation policies and the response by both foreign and Indian companies alike have
had many spillovers that are valuable for India’s technological capability. The growth of
the software industry has had wide-ranging impact on the economy. The demand for
software imports and the setting up of foreign development centres have contributed to
the rapid increase in compensation levels, estimated at an annual rate of 25% in the
second half of the 1990s. Other benefits have included stock options and good
employment opportunities, thereby slowing brain drain to some extent. Foreign
participation has exposed Indian engineers and scientists to new technologies and made
them more sensitive to the protection of intellectual property (software IP piracy was
estimated to have risen from 59% to 61% between 1999 and 2000 ( Krishnan, 2001).
Another factor has been the sharp increase in the output of degree- and diploma awarding
institutions. The number of institutions offering formal degree-level education in
engineering more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, from 339 to 776. Student intake
capacity also doubled with 80% rise in the science/engineering places.
Although venture capital organisations started to emerge in India in 1986, the growth of
technology-based ventures did not catch up. In the last decade, however, there has been
a substantial rise in IT-based venture capital. Nigam (2001) records that venture capital
investments reached $350 million in 2000, as against a figure of less than $5 million in
1995. A large chunk of this amount (70%) was directed into the IT sector. Many new
venture capital firms are being set up, either by Indian-based industrialists and young
professionals or by Indians based overseas.
Although recent studies (Chandrashekar and Basavarajappa, 2001; Mehta and Sarma,
2001) show that there has been little change in R&D intensity of Indian industry, there
has been a clear shift toward increased product development and innovation (Krishnan
and Prabha, 1999). This has been accompanied by increased awareness of intellectual
property (IP) rights and, by implication, the importance of patenting. According to the US
Patent Office, of the ten India-based organisations which filed the largest number of US
patents in the 1995-2000 period, three are Indian pharmaceutical companies. The CSIR
has also been filing patents in India and the US, all this result of new outward-looking
policies.
4. Science and Technology Policy in Relation to the Multilateral
System
India is a founder member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947
and its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which came into effect on
January 1 1995, after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. India's participation is based on the need to ensure more stability and
predictability in international trade with a view to achieving more trade and prosperity for
itself and the other members of the WTO. The multilateral trading system administered
by the WTO aims to bring about orderliness, transparency and predictability in global
trade through reductions in tariffs, progressive removal of non-tariff barriers, elimination
of trade-distorting measures and systems of values to serve as guidelines for national
legislation to bring about uniformity in laws and regulations everywhere.
The establishment of the WTO has created a forum for continuous negotiations to
reconcile differing and oftentimes conflicting interests of members. Although there is
unanimity in the provisions of International Trade theory that free trade enhances global
welfare, nationalism and differing goals as well as the appropriation of the benefits of
trade lead to many disagreements and conflicts within the global trading system.
Conflicts arise between developed and developing countries (as a result of differing
developmental needs and goals) and even between developed or developing country
blocs. India strongly subscribes to the multilateral approach to trade relations and grants
MFN treatment to all its trading partners, including even those, which are non-members
of the WTO. Within the WTO, India has committed itself to ensuring that the sectors in
which developing countries hold a comparative advantage are adequately opened up to
international trade and also that the special Differential Treatment Provisions for
developing countries under various WTO Agreements are translated into specific
enforceable dispensations in order that developing countries are facilitated in their
developmental efforts.
In line with the stance of many developing countries, India feels very strongly that the
multilateral system should reflect the concerns of developing countries. India supports its
arguments with basic principles. The Uruguay Round negotiators stated their intentions
clearly in the Preamble to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO. They
recognised that "their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living and ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income”. They also recognised "that there is
need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development." As India sees it,
globalisation has caused uneven growth, increasing the disparities between the richest
and poorest nations. There is need to address the implementation of existing
agreements and operationalising the special and differential clauses in favour of
developing countries.
India's WTO Commitment
Like other members of the WTO, India has a commitment to the multilateral body, both in
the formulation of policies and in the adherence to agreed policies. For the purpose of
this paper, it will suffice to look at India's stance regarding:
a) trade and foreign direct investment
b) the environment, and,
c) Science and technology, especially issues regarding trade related aspects of
intellectual property rights (TRIPS).
a) Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.
Since 1991, successive governments have progressively reduced tariff protection and
simplified India's restrictive import licensing regime. Tariffs have been reduced from an
average of 71 percent in 1993 to a current average of 20 percent. Also the number of
items subject to import licensing has been reduced, albeit with an emphasis on industrial
and capital goods. There is still need for further reforms in the import-licensing regime
and in the tariff structure, which remains complex and high in several industries.
India has simplified its foreign investment regime and opened up a number of sectors to
foreign direct investment. Foreign participation of up to 51 or 74 percent can take place
automatically in the manufacturing sector. Production in the food-manufacturing sector
has grown rapidly following increased investment. In this sector, up to 50 and 100
percent participation is allowed automatically for foreigners and non-resident Indians.
Permission for controlling equity in automobile manufacturing has triggered a high rate of
investment. The gap between FDI approvals and out-turns remain stubbornly high, with
the latter representing less than one-third of the former, at best. Greater transparency
and speed in decision-making could promote a more efficient and productive out-turn
b) The Environment (Montreal Protocol)
The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer is a landmark
international agreement designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The treaty
was signed in 1987, by 24 original members, and substantially amended in 1990 and
1992. The original list of members has expanded to 175. The Protocol stipulated the
phasing out of compounds that deplete the ozone layer by 2000 (2005 for methyl
chloroforms). India acceded to the Protocol on 17 September 1992. In 1993, it
proposed a detailed country programme to phase out ozone depleting substances (ODS)
in a manner that will not put undue economic burden on both consumers and industry.
Such a stance obviously causes delay in meeting international obligations but India
intends not only to meet its obligations but also continue to contribute to the formulation
and implementation of policies to achieve the provisions of the treaty.
c) The TRIPS Agreement.
While India takes several issues (see below) with the trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS) agreement, it has taken steps to meet some of the provisions
and intends to meet the deadline provided to developing countries. The TRIPS
Agreement is based on the recognition that increasingly the value of goods and services
entering into international trade resides in the know-how and creativity incorporated into
them. As table 7 shows, technology goods have greatly expanded their share of global
trade, from 54 percent in 1976 to 72 percent in 1996. The TRIPS agreement, therefore,
seeks to provide minimum international standards of protection for such know-how and
creativity in the areas of copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and
undisclosed information. It also contains provisions aimed at the effective enforcement
of such rights and provides for multilateral dispute settlement. Transitional periods by
which developed, developing and least-developed countries should meet obligations
under the Agreement are respectively January 1996, January 2000 and January 2006.
 
For reasons that will be discussed below, India, like China, has shown signs of
resistance to quick enforcement of the provisions of TRIPS. However, under pressure
from its own domestic industry and the United States, India strengthened its copyright
law in May 1994, placing it at par with international law. The new law, which came into
effect in May 1995, fully reflects the provisions of the convention on copyrights, to which
India is a party. India is required to comply with WTO-standard IPR laws by 2005. In the
meantime, India plans to participate fully in the evolution of a more equitable system
through the various forums.
TRIPS and India's Negotiating Stance with the WTO
The problems inherent in any system as complex as the WTO and comprising so many
members with differing interests, aims and objectives, cannot be overemphasised. Not
surprisingly, India while committed and having much faith in the multilateral body and in
multilateral negotiations, also has many apprehensions and disputes. Detailed
discussion of India's concerns is beyond the scope of this paper. Owing to its relevance
to this paper, we will consider India's negotiating stance with the WTO with regard to the
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
Agreement.
The TRIPS Agreement constitutes one of the most thorny issues in the WTO debate.
India sees two sides of this important coin that are difficult to reconcile. On the one
hand, there is provision to ensure availability of technology for development, especially to
developing countries. On the other, there is the recognition that owners of technology
need to be compensated for their proprietary knowledge. The debate has thus polarised
into one of developed versus developing countries’ interests. The preambular objective
of the TRIPS Agreement is a desire to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.
Another objective is to contribute to the transfer and dissemination of knowledge and
technology with a view to aiding socio-economic and technological development.
India raises three important issues regarding the TRIPS Agreement. These are (i)
technology transfer; (ii) biodiversity; and (iii) geographical indications.
i) Technology Transfer
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge, and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”. The statement is
clear in its recognition of the right of owners/developers of technology to seek a return on
their investment and of the obligations placed on users to provide compensation for
appropriating such knowledge. In recognising that the possibility exists for imbalance in
this two-party system, Article 8.2 states that appropriate measures may be needed to
prevent abuse of intellectual property rights by holders or “the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology”.
Urata (1998) argues that there is no evidence of transfer of technology to developing
countries. A recent analysis of the mode of technology transfers since the mid-1980s
suggests that since the mid-1980s there has been a reversal of the popularity of arm’s
length licensing towards intra-firm transfers. It notes that 80% of transfers by US
companies and 95% by German companies in 1995 were made on internal basis as
against figures of 60% and 92% respectively in 1985. Yet, the transfer of technology at
fair and most favourable terms has been highlighted in all discussions and debates on
sustainable development. The preambular statement of the WTO affirms the objective of
sustainable development in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns
of members at different levels of their development. The WTO is thus obligated by
implication, India argues, to facilitate easy access to and wide dissemination of
technology relevant for sustainable development. On the contrary, the adoption of
TRIPS is likely to restrict the imitative and adaptive R&D that most firms in developing
countries carry out (Kumar et al 1997) and which formed the basis of development in
many now advanced nations during their period of development.
The issue India takes with the TRIPS Agreement includes, inter alia, the following:
a) the fact that the TRIPS Agreement in its current form might tempt IPR holders to
charge exorbitant and commercially unviable prices for the transfer or dissemination of
technologies held through such IPRs. High cost of technology prevents poorer
developing countries from acquiring appropriate technology. There is thus need to
develop systems for the effective transfer of technology at fair and reasonable costs for
developing countries so as to harmonise the objectives of the WTO Agreement and the
TRIPS Agreement.
b) Article 40 recognises that licensing practices or conditions pertaining to IPRs could
restrain competition and have adverse effect on trade. Also, Article 66.2 obliges
developed country members to incentivise their enterprises to transfer technologies to
least developed countries. There has been very little progress on this front and there is
concern about the effectiveness of the Agreement to facilitate technology transfer.
c) A variant of the technology transfer agenda relates to the Committee on Trade and
Environment and the need to meet international environmental standards. The concern
here regards the need to make available, upon demand, environmentally-sound
technologies at fair and favourable terms to countries which have an obligation to adopt
these standards under international law.
d) Prospective technology seekers in developing countries face a number of difficulties in
their commercial dealings with holders in developed countries, namely those that arise
from imperfections in the market for technology, those attributable to the lack of
experience and skill in adequately concluding legal arrangements in the acquisition
process, and those government practices in both developed and developing countries
that influence and conditions the flow of technology. These difficulties need to be
addressed specifically in order to fully implement TRIPS provisions on technology
transfer.
(ii) Biodiversity
India sees an urgent need to harmonise the approaches to the utilisation of living
resources contained in the TRIPS Agreement, on one hand, and the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), on the other. The CBD categorically reaffirms that nation
states have sovereign rights over their own biological resources and recognises sharing
equitably the benefits that arise from the use of these resources, as well as from
traditional technology and knowledge. The TRIPS Agreement on the contrary, does not
address issues relating to patenting of plants and animals or to the issue of benefit
sharing in the commercial exploitation of in situ materials. It is important to reconcile the
provisions of the CBD and those of the TRIPS Agreement within the overall objective of
conservation of biological resources with sustainable development.
(iii) Geographical Indications
Geographical Indications of goods refers to the indication which identifies such goods as
agricultural goods, natural goods or manufactured goods, as originating or manufactured
in the territory of a country or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of such good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin, and in case where such goods are manufactured goods, then either
the goods are manufactured or processed in such territory, region or locality as the case
may be. Article 23 (Section 3 of Part 11) provides for additional protection for
geographical indications for wines and spirits. Unfortunately, such protection is not
available to other goods. India considers this a serious anomaly and proposes that such
higher level of protection should be available for other goods such as export-interest
items like basmati rice, Darjeeling tea and alphonso mangoes.
5. The Future of Science and Technology Policy in India
India has achieved world-class excellence in a number of science-intensive sectors such
as nuclear power, satellite communications and defence. Since nearly half of R&D
spending is incurred in theses sectors, the Government has been concerned to enhance
the spin-offs from these investments as well as encourage technology transfers between
these research centres and between the centres and the wider industry. India can also
be described as truly scientifically-proficient in many other years.
Even so, the Department of Science and Technology realises that there is urgent need to
"revitalise the scientific enterprise" of the country and raise the standards of S&T in
Indian institutions to meet the challenges of an increasingly technological world. The
Minister for Science and Technology, Dr Murli Joshi, has emphasised the need for India
to evolve its own S&T policy that is deeply rooted in the Indian “ethos of a holistic and
interactive approach to human nature and development” (Andhra News, 12/09/2001)..
To this end, the DST set up a committee under the chairmanship of Professor
Goverdhan Mehta in October 2001 to prepare a draft S&T Policy document and
implementation strategy for the years ahead. The document, which will be finalised this
year is ambitious and forward-looking and aims, inter alia, to
i) promote the teaching and practice of all disciplines of science at school and
college levels,
ii) encourage the participation of all sections of the population in S&T endeavours
iii) ensure that academic and R&D institutions function with the greatest autonomy
and accountability,
iv) integrate the teaching and practice of science with the widely prevalent and
existing knowledge,
v) harness modern scientific and technological advances so that rapid progress is
made in the improvement of the quality of life of the people
vi) encourage the highest level of innovation and R&D in industry and to promote
private/public collaboration in all areas of S&T,
vii) integrate science and technology with all spheres of national activity in order to
enhance India's global competitiveness,
viii) exploit the full power of S&T for the mitigation of natural hazards, particularly,
earthquakes, floods, cyclones and drought,
ix) use S&T as a vehicle for international co-operation and collaboration and to
promote the pooling and sharing of material and intellectual resources for common goals.
In effect, India plans to integrate science and technology into all spheres of national
activity and gear the generation of scientific and technological developments to poverty
alleviation and the improvement of the quality of life of its nationals.
India has achieved remarkable competence in a number of scientific and high-technology
areas. In the area of nuclear science and technology, it has developed competence in
atomic weaponry, nuclear power generation and the use of nuclear science in medicine.
India has successfully designed, built and launched its own communication satellite
systems. It’s strength in software design and IT is well known. This has become a
magnet for drawing global IT businesses into the economy. Recently, India unveiled it
first passenger jet aircraft and proposes to enter commercial airline production.
The new policy document is geared to strengthening these areas as well as developing
capabilities in other areas of national interest. India maintains collaborative S&T
projects with many advanced and developing countries. Although India has had S&T
ventures with a number of European countries, notably Britain and Germany, the first
EU-India agreement on co-operation in S&T was signed in July 2000. The agreement
seeks to encourage EU-wide collaboration with India in several areas of science and
technology. India proposes to strengthen its existing S&T ties as well as enter into new
ones for mutual benefit. It is also poised for a bigger voice in multilateral negotiations
with a view to working for a fairer system for developing countries.
6. Summary and Implications for EU-wide S&T Policy
The prosperity of any economy depends on the productivity of its economic assets. Many
studies have shown the vital role technological innovation plays in engendering
productivity growth and long-run economic growth, and in determining a nation’s
standard of living. In a globalising world economy, the link between innovative capacity
and prosperity has grown ever tighter and a rapid rate of innovation is needed to drive
productivity growth. Advanced countries are becoming increasingly labour-constrained.
Maintaining economic growth will, therefore, demand a stepped-up rate of innovation,
and perhaps, the importation of skilled labour from other countries, as has been
witnessed in some countries in recent years. Economic development in developing
countries will in a similar vein depend on a more efficient use of resources as well as
stepped-up innovation.
Like other countries, India in its quest to achieve industrialisation and improve the quality
of life of its people, has fostered an Industrial and S&T policy since the early years of
independence. Although it has achieved much progress in the area of science and
technology, a policy of isolationism and a failure to develop an appropriate mix of the
determinants of an effective NIS, has meant that today, India’s performance is much
lower than would have been the case otherwise. The poor performance started in the late
1960s. In the protected regime that India went for, it could not build capacity to innovate
and produce internationally competitive technologies. The process of liberalisation that
started in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, however, put competitive pressures
on Indian firms to modernise and upgrade their technologies. At the same time, many
MNEs entered the Indian market via FDIs and technology investments. Several foreignowned
and jointly-owned R&D centres have been established. Indian organisations and
institutions have been encouraged to become more commercial-orientated and outwardlooking.
Other measures have included direct intervention in forging links between
industry and universities and among firms, strengthening of existing infrastructure and
the creation of new institutions that may have important ingredients in the innovation
chain.
To meet the increasing challenge of globalisation, India has drawn up a new science and
technology policy document, which will form the basis for enhancement in its
technological capability in the coming years. The new document recognises the need to
shift the emphasis from S&T policy to “innovation” policy. To this end, the document aims
at establishing and strengthening techno-economic network rather than supporting
science and technology per se.
India’s history of science and technology policies holds valuable lessons for other
industrialising developing countries, and indeed for EU-wide S&T policies. While the EU
is composed of advanced and mostly scientifically advanced and proficient countries,
efforts to establish a EU-wide policy regime are worthwhile. First and foremost, an
agenda for EU-wide research (the ERA agenda) is a legal and political obligation under
the Amsterdam treaty. This recognises research and technological development (RTD)
as an essential element of industrialisation and employment, competitiveness and the
protection of its citizens and the environment. Secondly, an EU-wide S&T platform is
justifiable on account of the synergies that can be obtained from the fact that a) high level
research is increasingly complex and interdisciplinary; b) high level research is
increasingly costly, and c) certain high level research projects demand substantial
“critical mass”. Thirdly, EU countries conduct less research than Japan and the US. To
remain competitive, there is need to catch up with these major competitors.
Some lessons may be gleaned from the Indian experience with regarding to strategies
for achieving an effective policy regime at the EU level. Firstly, there is need to ensure
that research expenditures are cost-effective. India spent substantial sums of money
without engendering an effective NIS. Apart from exploratory basic research, efforts
should be made to achieve perceived potential benefits. Secondly, efforts must be
directed at determining what synergies, if any, exist between the S&T regimes of
member countries and develop strategies for exploiting them. This may imply a) the
mutual opening-up of national programmes; b) the networking of national level research
activities; c) the strengthening of existing EU S&T collaborative and joint initiatives; and
d) the establishment and strengthening of existing S&T ventures between the EU and
R&D proficient countries, such as India, in areas where these countries have
considerable strengths; and, f) the strengthening of the links between industry and
academia. Thirdly, steps must be taken to open up any protected markets to foreign
competition. This will induce EU firms to become globally competitive. India’s
companies lost the ability to compete in the protected environment in which they
operated. Lastly, the EU must take a leading role in multilateral negotiations with a view
to promoting proposals, which enhance free trade, sustainable development,
environmental protection and international relations.
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